characteristic Chinese attitude is also reflected in its theory of good and evil. Instead of ascribing evil to a superhuman princi ple, or of relegating it to a basically unreal phenomenal world, the Chinese theory of evil is inseparable from its theory of human nature. Evil exists; it is either inherent in human nature--which, however, can learn to control it by education-or the product of contact between an originally good nature and its wicked environment. We know these to be the teachings of Hsiintzu 荀 子 （ 313 -138 BC) and of Mencius 孟 子 （ 372-289 BC ?) re spectively. They began the Great Debate in Chinese philosophy, on a topic where East meets West, since the subject contains metaphysical as well as ethical and psychological implications.
Speakin? superncially, one might say that while Mencius won the debate in China, Hsiin-tzu won it in the West. Such expressions, as "man's corrupt nature" and "human depravity" , come to our mind, loaded with meaning and pathos, and stand ing in stark contrast to the serenity of most Chinese theorists of human nature. The truth, however, is less obvious and much more complicated. In both East and Wext, the debate was not over the 'same' human nature, but its several 'states， ，hypothe tical or experienced. For Mencius and Hsiin-tzu, these were the 'original，nature: man as he was born, and the 'existential， state: man as he found himself in society. In the Christian West, human nature can be said to have 'three moments， : 'integral， nature, as it was in Adam before original sin, 'fallen' nature, the result of Adam's 'unhappy' legacy, and 'redeemed' nature, as renewed by the grace of Christ. W ithin this conceptual frame work, we can see how, through the triumph of Mencius, East and West concur in aereeinff on an 'originally good' human 一 nature, with the difference that Mencius saw this in the infant yet untouched by social culture while Christians attribute it to Adam before the Fall. Hsiin-tzu， s 'originally wicked man' could never have known a pre-culture state of goodness, be that at birth or in the person of Adam.
The depths and extent of the ravages of the primordial Fall, as well as the depths and extent 01 ttie effects of redeeming grace on man, have been the subjects of much theological controversy in the West. Differing interpretations have especially been offered concerning the fallibility of human nature-troubled by £C concupiscence， ， 一 and about the moral "newness" and power ac corded by "justification， ， . Both these doctrines-which repre sent realities that are not mutually exclusive-are especially contained in the Epistle to the Romans, and the controversies waged over it reflect a continual tension between two contrary attitudes: Pelagianism and anti-Pelagianism, a tension still being felt today. Both sides admit original sin and the need of grace, but the exact depth and meaning of each has been matter for hot debate. The problem has become more complicated with the discovery of non-Christian cultures and religious philosophies, and the recognition that many ^non-Christians5 5 might very well be " anonymous Christians" who have experienced grace. The dividing line between the pagan in the "fallen state， ， yet untouched by grace, and the Christian himself, a friend of God, has become very difficult to draw, and that, at a time when increasing secularization has made the world more alike in unbelief than in any one faith. The development has therefore been paradoxical. For, at the very moment when theologians are becoming more aware of the permeating interplay of sin and grace in the whole human race, both in and out of Christianity, as well as of the deeply spiritual and religious bases of all cultures, many individuals and groups seem to be drifting towards religious indifference^ a "neopaganism， ， more pagan than any hitherto-known historic paganism.
The task, therefore, has become very urgent, that all men pre occupied with ultimate concerns should understand one another better, especially since, granted the universal operation of grace, one can hardly label any genuine religious philosophy as belong ing merely to the oft-disdained category of "natural th e o lo g y ， ， . 7
In this perspective, non-Christian insights into human nature can be very valuable to Christian thinkers of today, who are growing conscious of the Hellenic biases of much doctrinal formulation, and anxious, first to return to the Semitic expressi ons of Christian revelation, and then to re-interpret it meaning fully to the non-Christian world. Ih is is the motive that prompted the reviewer of Leslie D e w a r t， s The Future o f Belief, to insist:
Ic should be a major task of Christian thinkers both solidly knowledge able in and skeptic with regard to traditional theology to engage in large-scale religious research in at least some of the great number of 7. In our own day, K arl Barth especially, by insisting that Christianity see all reality which is not God in the lignt of His Word, stands in opposition against any kind of "natural theology" ， including Aquinas' Aristotelianism, In the Han 漢 （ 202 BC-220 AD) and Wei-Chin 魏 ー 晉 （ 220 一 420 AD) dynasties, the prevalent tendency was to divide human beings into three "grades" . Wang C h ， u n g 王 充 （ 27-100 AD?) offers the opinion that Mencius was referring-to people above the average when lie spoke of human nature as originally good, Source Book, p. 293-296. W ang 's ideas might have played an important role in the subsequent " nine-grade ranking system， ， inaugurated by Emperor W en 文 （ 220-227 AD) of the Wei dynasty, which led to many abuses, since it was presumed that the scions of the important families belonged to the " higher grades" . As to the " grade theory" itself, W ang might have received it from his teacher Pan Piao 班 彪 ，o n e of the historians responsible for the Han Shu 漢 書 (History of the Han Dynasty), which includes a " three-nine" grading classification for legendary and historical figures. 12. For a discussion on this point, see L i Shi Yi, " W ang C h， u n g ， ， ，in T ， ie n Hsia Monthly， 5 (October, 1937)， 299-302. As to Hsiin-tzu, he definitely maintains that even the born wicked can attain sagehood, an idea which, irrespective of its logic, saved his system from fatalism and also illustrates the " democratic" nature of his thinking, in spite of his insistence on laws for the government of men.
13. For H a n ， s ideas on hum an nature, see Chinese use the same word for " sin" and " crime" (tsui 罪 ） . It has been put forward that Western society is a " guilt-conscious" society pre-occupied with sin and m an's moral responsibility, whereas Chinese society is a "shamec-onscious" society where the sense of wrong is noi internalized. In W ith the given ideal of sagehood as "harmony with Nature， ' ， the violation of，or interference with, one's human nature becomes an "ontological" rather than "moral" evil. Besides, in K uo's system, there was no place for free will.
Buddhism developed in China through interactions with
Taoism, both on the intellectual and popular levels. The seven early Buddhist schools were pre-occupied with the ques tion of whether dharma had any ultimate reality, in other words, with the meaning of the Taoist "non-being" .21 Their meta physical discussions remind one of the medieval European con troversy over the reality of " U n iv e r s a ls ， ， . 22 The Chinese re 19. Lao Tzu chu 老子雷主(Commentary on Lao Tzu), in Chan， op. cit.，32 1.By his concern with metaphysics, W ang Pi also prepared the ground for Neolionfucianism.
Chuang Tzu chu ;]士子 g (Commentary on
Chuang Tzu), in Chan, op. cit" 326. By saying that everything has its own nature and each nature has its own ultimate, K uo anticipated the Neo-Confucians. 21. Dharma here refers to " all t h in g s ， ， ， o r " elements of existence" . The con troversy, basically, was whether there was an " objective r e a lit y ， ，in things, or in anything at all. This doubt resembles more the tendency of modem European philosophers since the time of Descartes, with the philosophical postion of H um e-concerning the m ind and reality-closest to that of Hinayana Buddhism. A D )-whose discussion of things and names especially approached the medieval European discussion of the universals. In general, the importance occupied by discussions on the m ind and reality in Chinese Buddhism matched the importance occupied by the European scholastic discussion on universals.
23. H u Shih 胡適 called the C h 'an movement a " reformation or revolution in Buddhism" . See his article, " C h 'an (Zen) Buddhism in China: its History and M ethod ' ' ，Philosophy East and West, 3 (1953) ，p . 12. It represented certainly a great departure from original Buddhism, so that one may say that the triumph of C h ， a n implied also the failure of Indian Buddhism to establish itself in China or Japan. 24. For a discussion of both C h ， a n and Amidism, see Edward Conze, Buddhism， Its Essence and Development (Oxford: Bruno Cassirer, 1957)，200-207. W . Eberhard also remarks on the " irrelevance of moral life" in Chinese Bud dhism, including Am iaism ，even though it was a " salvation" religion， since the extreme conclusion of belief in grace as being sufficient was thaa no repentance for sin was required. Cf. op, cit" 20~-23.
Human nature and the human heart or mind, the central interest of the C h ， a n Buddhists, became the main preoccupation In this respect, it can be pointed out that Paul Tillich's inter pretation of the primordial Fall comes closest to the assumptions of this Neo-Confucian distinction between " basic" or "essential" nature and the " existential" state in which it is found. Tillich rejects the literal interpretation of the Paradise story and descri bes " actualised creation" and "estranged existence" as identical.
The state of sin represents the transition from "essence" to " e x is te n c e ， , .
...everything (God) created participates in the transition from essence to existence. He creates the newborn child; but，if created, it falls into the state of existential estrangement... (and)， upon growing into maturity, affirms the state of estrangement in acts of freedom which im ply responsi bility and guilt. Creation is good in its essential character. I f actualised, it falls into universal estrangement through freedom and destiny.32
Chang also emphasized the importance of ascesis, or "self-.c u lt iv a t io n ， ， ，fo r the sake of improving the quality of our <cen-dowment" . Repeating, after Mencius, that " to know the heart completely is to know one's nature and to know Heaven" ，he sees the practice of love as the means for removing the differences' between the self and the non-self, and so of attaining the state of becoming one with all things. After all, man is actually part of Nature, and the truer is his unity with Nature, the better also is his own nature. In a very famous passage, he says: The two famous brothers, C h ， e n g Hao and Ch'eng I ，both accepted the distinction Chang made concerning essential nature and its "concrete" endowment in man. It is ，a fte r a ll,a better conceptual tool than the former, arbitrary predication of "evil" 
When the ch,i is pure, so is ts'ai; when the cti t is dirty，so too is t s ， a L
丁s， ai-capacity-may be good or evil, hsing-Nature-is always good.37
In order to transform our endowment or capacity, the brothers： recommend the reverent custody of the heart or mind, ching 敬 ， . is, the knowledge of moral matters, throuffh assiduous study.
Asked about the art of moral cultivation, he had said:
The sincerity of the will depends upon the extension of knowledge and the extension of knowledge depends upon the investigation o f things
There is principle (li) in everything，and one must investigate principle to the utmost.… When one has accumulated much knowledge he will naturally achieve a thorough understanding like a sudden release.38
O n this account, it has often been said that the elder Ch， eng:
inaugurated the idealistic wing of Neo-Confucianism with its unilateral emphasis on inner reverence in self-cultivation, while the younger Ch'eng inaugurated the rationalistic wing, which recommended, besides ching, the practice of ko-wu, the "investiffa-.
Erh C h ， e n g i-shu 19. No explanation is given as to why c h ， i might be impure
and give rise to evil. Hence, to attribute evil to c h ， i implies the admission that evil is a natural fact.
38.
Ts， ui-yen 粋 言 {Selected Sayings)^ in Chan, Source Book，op. ciL, 560-561. W hile C h 'eng I and Chu Hsi, by insistence on ko-wu 格ネ勿，investigation of things and their principles，approach the current of "gradual enlip^hten-ment" in C h 'an Buddhism, the idea of "sudden r e le a s e ， ' quoted here suggests a " sudden" enhgntenment to which one prepares self by assiduous study. To say that m an is fallible is to say that the limitation peculiar to a being who does not coincide with himself is the primordial weakness from which evil arises.42
A partial explanation of " turbidity'， in human nature is given in Chu's theory of "desire， ， ，je n y ii 人 慾 (human desire), also called ssu y ii 私 愁 (selfish desire) in the individual. This t4de-s ir e ， ， ，w h ic h is characteristic of all men, is of metaphysical origin.
Distinguishing between "nature" ，as the pre-stirred state of the human heart or mind, and "feelings" as the post-stirred state, he says:
Desire emanates from feelings. The heart (or mind) is comparable to water, nature is comparable to the tranquillity of still water, feeling is comparable to the flow of water, and desire is comparable to its waves.
The Problem of Evil 4 1 . Chu-tzu yii-lei 4. Let it be remembered that the Neo-Confucians, after Mencius, held that all men can be sages. As a means towards overcoming bad desires and promoting good ones, Chu Hsi proposes wide and extensive learning:
W hat sages and worthies call extensive learning means to study every thing. From the most essential and most fundamental about oneself to every single thing or affair in the world，even the meaning of one word or half a word， everything should be investigated to the utmost, and none of it is unworthy of attention.44
Chu H s i， s contemporary, Lu Chiu-yiian, objected to the duali stic explanation of li and ch'i as components of the universe and o f man, as well as to the undue emphasis on learning. Lu regards all things as one: the human heart or mind is li, and since the universe is also li, the two are really one, as microcosm and mac rocosm. There is no need, therefore, to pursue wide knowledge.
One only has to know the heart exhaustivly. For this reason, he has been described as an idealist philosopher.
Lu shows no interest in cKi. In discussing human nature, he merely says that goodness is prior and innate, while evil is poste rior and acquired. A key to the understanding of evil is wu-yii 物 您 (material desire), which, however, is not explained.
Where there is good, there must be evil. (The transition from one to the other) is truly (like) turning over one's hands, goodness is so from the very beginning, whereas evil comes into existence only as a result of such a 'turning o v e r ， . 45 The universe is my heart and m ind，and my heart and m ind is the universe.
Sages appeared tens of thousands of generations ago.
They shared this heart; they shaared this principle.
Sages will appear tens of thousands of generations to come. They will share this heart; they will share this principle.47
All that Lu talked about, was this "heart" or "m ind" . And yet, unfortunately, he has never explained its nature fully.
Christian literature has much more to say about this fundamental principle of all human activity, the deepest recess of the person and his mystery, whether that be called heart, mind or soul: given in Chan, Source . I should like to point out that the Chinese word hsin 心、 ，translated as heart or m ind，includes the connotations of both these English words. It refers to the deepest principle in man from whicn all acts flow. Neo-Confucian spirituality, the summation of the mystical thought already present in Mencius. I f the ideal of sagehood implies the unity between man and Heaven-the word referring earlier to a personal Absolute, and later to a less anthropomorpliic and more impersonal T'ai-chi-then the heart, with its innate moral intuition, is doubtless the place where this communion takes place. The concept of the man who practises inner reve rence, and comes into communion with the Absolute, is very close to the ideal of Christian mysticism:
German mysticism often named as its ideal the man 'of the heart，(innig), the 'collected' (gesammelt) man, that is, whose whole activity is an exhaustive expression of his innermost centre and his innermost vital decision，and who therefore remains 'collected' in this innermost centre without being dispersed in anything alien to his decision.50
The philosophy of both Lu and Wang has been described as " subjective ontological monism" . Subjective and monistic they certainly were, but their monism was not strictly an "ontolo-.
gical" one. By saying that " the heart contains everything"， they did not necessarily deny the existence of an objective uni verse. Far from it. Both men were practical moralists, not speculative metaphysicians. I f they have given the impression of teaching an "ontological monism" ，it is on account of the absence of an explicit principle of " analogy" in Chinese thoyght, whick keeps it open to mistaken, univocal interpretations. And so it is my contention that the "rationalist" and "idealist" cur rents of Neo-Confucianism represent two approaches to spiri tuality, which are related to the divergence of the schools of "gradual" and "sudden" enlightenment in the development 50. K arl Rahner, op. cit" p. 374 .
The Problem of Evil of Ch'an Buddhism, but which, perhaps, present even a greater resemblance to the two current movements in Christian, es pecially Roman Catholic, spirituality. The "rationalists" re semble the traditionalists, who emphasize the practice of moral virtues, and therefore, man's role in his search for moral per fection, and the " existentialists， ， 一 for lack of a better name, the word "mystical" being ambivalent-who highlight the role of God, of grace, and of direct interpersonal relationship between the soul and its indwelling Guest.
Is it besides not possible, that，in our present dissatisfaction with the Greek-Aristotelian-"happ;ness" ethics imulicit in Christian morality, the idea of moral self-fulnlment, such as expressed in the doctrine of liang-chih, contains great potential for fruitful reflection ? Moral self-fulfilment needs not neces sarily be selfish, especially when man's relationship and openness to God is recognized. M a n 's purposiveness and striving, thus, reside in his seeking creatively, not to be happy, but to be. The Christian doctrine of grace can be totally integrated with this idea if we keep in m ind that the free self creation of man takes place in the presence of G od .…51 Such a perspective would free Christian morality from certain oft-valid charges of the exploitation of religious "illusions" .
Besiaes, it denies nothine-fundamentally genuine in the "hap piness" principle. As Paul Tillich has remarked, the Greek word zubatfxovia has suffered much in its English translation of "happiness" ，which, in turn, has deteriorated badly in meaning. Sung-Ming Philosophy, (3rd ed., Taipei, 1962)，p. 199. tzu, like Wang Ch'ung after him, has never adequately explained how a basically bad human nature can be transformed into a sage. For orthodox Confucianism knows nothing of "grace"一 as does Christianity. As far as Wang Shou-jen is concerned, all we can say is that, had he not died at the age of 5 6 ，h e might have left us a lucid explanation of his Four Maxims.
The difference between the "pre-stirring" and "post-stirring" states of the heart or mind is important because of the implicit recognition of freedom and its exercise, which alone can confer a moral quality on our interior or exterior activity. This is fun damental to any moral system, and that is why, we may say, the mystery of evil resides in that of freedom. In discussing "The Theological Concept of Concupiscentia" , Karl Rahner points out the essentially "natural" character of "concupiscentia" , as something immediately given with human nature, even in its "pure" state. Speaking in existentialist terms of the human person as "man in so far as he freely disposes of himself by his decision" ， and of human nature as "all that in man which must be given prior to this disposal" ，he describes " theological" concupiscentia as a tension or dualism between "person" and "nature" :
There is much in man which always remains in concrete fact somehow impersonal，impenetrable and unilluminated for his existential decision; merely endured and not freely acted out. It is this dualism between person and nature... that we call concupiscence in the theological sense. W hile it does... find its concrete experiential expression in a dualism of spirituality and sensibility, it is not identical with the latter.57
This concupiscentia cannot be qualified as "morally evil" ， since it precedes the free decision. Rahner, however, is aware that, 57. Karl Rahner，Theological Investigations I ，op, cit,, p. 369. J u lia Ching in Romans 6-8, "concupiscence" has been termed "sin" ，d/uaprca. He reasons, therefore, that it can be called "evil" in one sense: in so far as it is only present in man in its concrete form, in virtue of " the Fall of the first man" ，as an experienced contra diction in man himself， admittedly so according to Paul, Augus tine, the great Scholastics,the Reformers and Pascal. In this case, it is the " c o n c u p is c e n c e ， ， ，n o t of t£pure nature''，but of "fallen n a t u r e ， ， . 58 As regards moral endeavour as "recovery" of a certain "integrity" ，he also makes a distinction between the "integrity" of Adam in Paradise, and the recovered "inno cence" of the perfect Christian:
In Adam the person's freedom... made it possible for him exhaustively to engage his nature both in a good and in an evil direction. The freedom of ...the (Christian) saint is the freedom of a man who has succeeded in surrendering his whole being... to God totally.59
Hum an fallibility, after all, is related to man's finite, created freedom, without which there can be no love in mutual friendship between God and the creature. That is why, if the mystery of evil is rooted in that of freedom, freedom, in turn, is rooted in the mystery of love. Besides, from the Christian viewpoint, it is yet another mystery which distinguishes between NeoConfucian and Christian answers to the problem of evil:
58. Ibid" Although there is no "primordial F a ll， ' in orthodox Chinese thought, there has been， in popular Buddhism, a tendency to regard hum an beings as having been originally good，but having later become evil in the course of history. According to some popular texts, the dividing line came at the end of the Chou dynasty (early 3rd cent. BC), This idea probably derived from that of kalpa (world era) in philosophical Buddhism. But the Confucians did not explicitly discuss such a possibility，although they usually acclaimed the goodness of former sages, and decried the moral degeneration of their own days. See Eberhard, op, cit.，p. 21. 59. Karl Rahner，op. cit" p. 374. 
